Civil Procedure/Justiciability: Dispute Between City and United States Remanded for Standing Analysis
"Because the district court did not properly analyze the City's standing to sue the United States, we remand the case for such consideration." The Eighth Circuit thus remanded City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, et al., to decide whether Clarkson Valley, Missouri, has standing to sue the federal government over a road-widening project.
The underlying dispute concerns the environmental impact of a road-widening project. The City, suing under the Administrative Procedure Act and 28 USC 1131, claims that the FHA failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act when it OK'd the widening of the road.
The FHA asserted the City's lack of standing in a motion to dismiss, and later in a motion for summary judgment. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss standing argument as premature and the second on the basis that the FHA's brief "[did] not contain any citations to the record in support of its argument that Clarkson Valley lacks standing."
The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that under Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), standing is an element of the plaintiff's cause of action and thus should have been decided on the basis of the pleadings, in the case of the motion to dismiss, or on the record, in the case of the motion for summary judgment. The Court also instructed the District Court to conduct a zone-of-interests standing analysis, as well.
Notes after the jump.
The relevant quote from the opinion on standing:
Because the requirements of standing "are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation." Id. Thus, in response to a motion to dismiss, "general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for . . . we 'presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.'" Id. (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)) (alteration in original). In
response to a motion for summary judgment, "the plaintiff[s] can no longer rest on such mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true." Id. (quotations omitted).
The Court cited Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1036 (8th Cir. 2002), for the zone-of-interests test, which in turn cites Bennett v. Spear,520 U.S. 154 (1997), which in turn cites the seminal case of Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970).
