Second Life Copyright Infringement Lawsuit Could Kick Off The Next Trend in Intellectual Property Litigation

Several plaintiffs have filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement and Lanham Act claims against Thomas Simon. See Baca v. Simon, No. 07-4447 (E.D.N.Y., filed 10/24/07) (view full text of the complaint here).

 

What makes this case so remarkable is that everything occurred in Second Life. Simon copied various items that the plaintiffs create and sell in Second Life. The lawsuit has received nationwide attention (coverage at the Patry Copyright Blog and Second Life Blogger). This should be a straightforward copyright infringement case.  

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Another Arkansas Appellate Decision Regarding MNBA America Arbitration Provision

The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a refusal to confirm arbitration award in MBNA America  Bank, N.A. v. Gilbert, No. 06-1324 (10/31/07). This is the third case in a recent series involving an arbitration provision used by MBNA America. See MBNA America Bank., N.A. v. Blanks (previously posted (9/20/07); Danner v. MBNA America Bank, N.A. (previously posted 4/27/07).

 

The arbitration provision is a letter MBNA sent to consumers that purported to unilaterally amend the cardholder agreement to include an arbitration provision. Gilbert did one thing different from the other parties: he filed a response with the arbitration forum, arguing that the arbitration provision was not a valid agreement. The forum entered an award for MBNA. Then he failed to challenge the award within 90 days as required by the Federal Arbitration Act.  

 

The court of appeals held that filing the response meant Gilbert participated in the arbitration. Gilbert waived any defenses by  participating in the arbitration proceeding and then failing to comply with the Federal Arbitration Act. The court reversed and directed the trial court to confirm the arbitration award.

Architecture Copyright Infringement Lawsuit Can Seek Reputational Damages

The District Court of Minnesota refused to dismiss part of an architectural design copyright infringement complaint in U.S. Home Construction v. R.A. Kot Homes, Inc., 2007 WL 3037321 (D. Minn. 10/16/07).

 

Plaintiff owns two copyright registrations for an architectural design called the Remington. Defendant built a home that allegedly copied this design. Plaintiff filed a copyright infringement suit and asked for reputational damages but did not include a Lanham Act claim for unfair competition.

 

Defendant moved to dismiss the part of the complaint seeking reputational damages. The court rejected this argument and cited several cases that have permitted copyright owners to recover reputational damages. The court's opinion suggests Plaintiff will have additional remedies if it files an under the Lanham Act.

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Arkansas Temporary Restraining Order Reversed Because Plaintiff Failed to Include an Affidavit or Verified Complaint

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a temporary restraining order for failure to comply with Ark. R. Civ. P. 65 in IBAC Corp. v. Becker, No. 07-252 (10/25/07).

 

This case involves the Royal Arkansas Hotel and Suites in Pine Bluff. Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit for fraud and related claims. Plaintiffs requested the TRO but failed to include an affidavit or verified complaint that irreparable harm will occur without the TRO. The trial court granted the TRO without a hearing. Among other things, the TRO required a full inspection of the hotel's financial records and prevented any transfer of hotel assets.

 

The court easily dismissed the TRO. There are only two ways to obtain preliminary injunctive relief in Arkansas: (1) provide notice to the other side and have a hearing; or (2) the plaintiff must submit an affidavit or verified complaint stating that irreparable harm will occur. In this case, the plaintiffs failed to comply with the rule. The opinion does not state the amount of the bond, if any, that plaintiffs had to post to get the TRO.

Arkansas Insured's Award of Attorney's Fees was Small but Reasonable

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed an award of attorney's fees in Running M Farms, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Arkansas, Inc., No. 07-212 (10/25/07).

 

This case has a long history. It all began in 1997 when Farm Bureau denied coverage based under a crop-hail insurance policy when Running M's wheat crop was damaged by a hail storm. Running M filed suit in 1999 and, although Farm Bureau twice confessed judgment of $76,500, the case proceeded to two trials and two appeals. See 366 Ark. 480 (2006) and 348 Ark. 313 (2002).

 

On the third appeal, the final issue here was the award of attorney's fees pursuant to A.C.A. § 23-79-208. Judgment was entered on the $76,500 confessed by Farm Bureau. The trial court awarded Running M attorney's fees of $16,800. The trial court applied the requisite 8 factors to determine a reasonable fee. Newcourt Financial v. Canal Ins. Co., 341 Ark. 452 (2000).

 

Running M appealed the ruling and argued that the fee award was too small for 2 trials and 2 appeals spread across 7 years of litigation. The supreme court affirmed the award, noting that the trial court properly applied the 8 factors. The court paid special attention to the fact that Running M could have avoided much of the time and expense in this litigation by accepting the confession of judgment.

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Arkansas Law of Conversion: Defendant Owns Converted Property When Judgment to the Plaintiff is Satisfied

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed judgment in an odd conversion case. Huffman v. Landers Ford North, Inc., No. 07-157 (10/24/07).

 

The Huffmans were interested in buying a Ford Freestyle from Landers Ford. They took the Freestyle home for an overnight test drive and left their 1996 Taurus at Landers. They had to sign a Retail Buyer's Order Form, which has language to suggest it is not a contract. The next day Ms. Huffman called to say they did not want to buy the Freestyle. This is where it gets interesting. On the way to Landers, she wrecked the Freestyle. Landers claimed the Retail Buyer's Order Form was a contract to purchase the Freestyle, and they refused to return the Taurus.

 

The jury made three key findings: (1) there was no contract between the parties; (2) Ms. Huffman negligently operated the Freestyle and inflicted $12,2410 damages on Landers; and (3) Landers committed conversion of the Taurus, inflicting $6,500 damage on the Huffmans. The trial court entered judgment for Landers of $5,740 and held that Landers now owns the Taurus.

 

The court of appeals affirmed. When a defendant converts property and satisfies judgment to the plaintiff, the defendant becomes the new owner of the property.  Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Davis, 68 Ark. 112 (1900).

Arkansas Fraudulent Concealment to Extend the Limitations Period Only Applies When Reasonable Diligence Would not Have Discovered the Fraud.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a dismissal based on statute of limitations in Pambianchi v. Howell, No. 06-1239 (10/24/07).

 

The dispute arises over an unremarkable automobile accident that occurred on June 9, 2000. Claims for negligence and most torts would expire on June 9, 2003. In 2002, Pambianchi settled her claim against Howell and received payment of $46,763.88 from Howell's insurer, Southern Farm Bureau.

 

In 2004, Pambianchi sued Howell for negligence and Southern Farm Bureau for fraud in procuring the settlement. She claimed that Howell's insurance agent misled her into the settlement by telling her she could recover additional money from other parties. The trial court dismissed both claims on grounds that the statute of limitations had run.

 

In affirming the dismissal, the court of appeals set out the rule of fraudulent concealment. Fraudulent concealment will suspend the statute of limitations, but only until the plaintiff discover the fraud or should have discovered the fraud through reasonable diligence. If reasonable diligence might have detected the fraud, the plaintiff is presumed to have knowledge of it. Curry v. Thornsberry, 354 Ark. 631 (2003). The reasonable diligence aspect of the rule is the most crucial and proved fatal to Pambianchi's claims.  

 

This rule is important because of the growing trend in consumer fraud cases for plaintiffs to plead fraudulent concealment. To survive a dispositive motion, plaintiffs must establish they acted with reasonable diligence and that reasonable diligence would not have detected the fraud.

Arkansas Supreme Court to Hear Arguments in Harrison, Arkansas

The Arkansas Supreme Court will conduct oral argument at the John Paul Hammerschmidt Conference Center-North Arkansas College in Harrison, Arkansas on Thursday, November 1, 2007 beginning at 9:00 a.m.


The announcement is here. The Court is holding argument in Harrison by virtue of Amendment 80:

This will only be the sixth occasion in modern times that the Supreme Court has held court outside of Little Rock. Since 2002, the Supreme Court has held oral argument in Fayetteville, Fort Smith, Jonesboro, Monticello, and Hope. Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution, adopted by vote of the people in 2000, provides that the Supreme Court may meet at such times and places as may be designated by the Court.


"New Judicial Federalism in Arkansas: Five Years After the Annus Mirabilis" Available for Download

Christian Harris presented his talk, "New Judicial Federalism in Arkansas: Five Years After the Annus Mirabilis" at the Arkansas Fall Judicial Conference/Judicial Council Meeting in Fort Smith, on October 19, 2007.

An annotated PDF copy of the talk is available here.

No Arkansas Appellate Opinions This Week

No opinions this week -- the judges are all at Judicial Conference. In fact, this is the second day of the conference.

Christian Harris presented his talk, "New Judicial Federalism in Arkansas: Five Years After the Annus Mirabilis" yesterday at the Judicial Conference meeting. We will have a link to the PDF of the presentation slides, annotated with case law and article citations available shortly.

How Will the Ticketmaster Case Impact the Arkansas Hannah Montana Investigation?

The Arkansas Attorney General is investigating 5 software providers regarding ticket sales to the Hannah Montana concert in Little Rock (coverage here by Arkansas Business). Ticketmaster recently won a preliminary injunction against one such software provider in Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Technologies, Inc. (posted here 10/18/07). How will this injunction affect the Arkansas investigation?

 

The Ticketmaster case should not have any effect, because consumers do not have standing to bring a cause of action. First, there is no direct communication between the software provider and the consumer.  Without a direct communication, there can be no fraud or deceptive trade practice or contract between the parties to breach. Second, the software provider never accesses the consumer's computer or any property of the consumer. The software at issue manipulates Ticketmaster's website and computer system; the consumer cannot have a claim for an interference with Ticketmaster's property.

 

The most important hurdle is damages. Consumers have no damages against the software provider because they were never guaranteed a ticket, much less guaranteed a ticket at the face value. The only possible claim would be the loss of, or interference with, a fair opportunity to obtain a ticket. This is too speculative to be compensable. More importantly, this type of injury would fail to state a claim under the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. See Wallis v. Ford Motor Co., 362 Ark. 317, 208 S.W.3d 153 (2005). An attempt to bring an ADTPA claim here would be an overextension of the ADTPA, something I cautioned against in a recent article. See 29 Univ. Ark. Little Rock Law Rev. 283 (2007).

 

As to the individuals reselling the tickets at a premium, they are violating the anti-scalping law. See A.C.A. § 5-63-201. However, this statute does not create a private cause of action, and a violation is only a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum fine of $500 per offense. Prosecuting attorneys are not about to drop everything to focus on misdemeanor arrests, nor should they. Consumers who purchased tickets from scalpers could have a claim for breach of contract as far as the contract was for illegal subject matter. Of course, damages would be limited to the amount paid in excess of the face value. It would not be worth the costs associated with bringing a lawsuit.

Arkansas Attorney General Helps Ticketmaster Win Preliminary Injunction Against Provider of Automated Software Used to Buy Bulk Tickets

The Central District of California granted a preliminary injunction in Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Technologies, Inc., No. 07-2534 (10/16/07; full text of order here).

 

Ticketmaster sells tickets for entertainment and sports events to the public. Access to its website is governed by specific Terms of Use, which prohibit the use of automated software. Ticketmaster has had some negative press recently when its events sell out in a matter of minutes. Tickets to these events then appear on websites such as StubHub at prices significantly above their face value (or they are offered for free with a $500 coffee mug). The problem comes from software that permits its users to infiltrate the Ticketmaster system and purchase bulk quantities of tickets.  

 

RMG is one such software provider that designs a software specifically tailored to elude the policing controls in force by Ticketmaster. The software is run through RMG's computer system.  RMG's customers log in to RMG's system and then use the software to purchase bulk tickets. Ticketmaster filed suit primarily for copyright infringement, violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and breach of contract.

 

The court anchored its decision on two main points: (1) Ticketmaster owns a copyright in its website; (2) visitors to the website are granted a nonexclusive license to use the website under the conditions set out in the Terms of Use. The court held that RMG itself violated the Terms of Use and caused its customers to violate the Terms of Use. As a result, Ticketmaster showed a likelihood of success on all its causes of action.

 

As to irreparable harm, Ticketmaster received some help from the Arkansas Attorney General. The court observed that public outcry over the unavailability of Hannah Montana tickets caused the Attorneys General of Arkansas and Missouri to initiate investigations. The court held that RMG was causing extensive damage to Ticketmaster's goodwill, which amounts to irreparable harm. Ticketmaster was required to post a $300,000 bond.   

First Amendment Trumps Right of Publicity in Fantasy Baseball Case

The Eighth Circuit issued its much anticipated opinion in a dispute regarding the use of professional baseball statistics in fantasy games. C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., No. 06-3357/3358 (10/16/07). This was an important case, with amici briefs filed by the NFLNBA, NHL, NASCAR, PGA and WNBA. The district court opinion was previously posted here (1/18/07).

 

CBC operates a fantasy baseball game using Major League Baseball players' names and statistics. In previous years, CBC licensed the names and statistics from the Major League Baseball Players Association. This dispute arose when MLBPA refused to renew the license but CBC continued to use the names and statistics in its games. The MLBPA brought claims under the Missouri right of publicity statute. The district court concluded that CBC did not violate the statute, that first amendment concerns trumped the statute, and that the statute was not preempted by the Copyright Act.

 

The Eighth Circuit affirmed on first amendment grounds. The right of publicity statute at issue only requires (1) the defendant use the plaintiff's name as a symbol of his identity (2) without consent (3) and with the intent to obtain a commercial advantage. The court held that CBC's use of the players' names and statistics satisfied these elements. However, state law rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment considerations. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).

 

Discussed more after the break, the court found that first amendment concerns trump the right of publicity statute. This determination made the preemption issue moot, and the court declined to address preemption.

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A Footnote Holding on Abstracting: Permissible to Include Discovery Attached as Exhibits to Pleadings In the Addendum

A final appellate practice lesson on Francis v. Protective Life Insurance Company is that, contrary to former practice, "[p]leadings and documentary evidence shall not be abstracted.” Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2(a)(5) (2007).

Protective Life argued in this case that Francis's brief should be sent for rebriefing because she didn't include an abstract. The Court held in a footnote holding that in cases where there are no hearings and no testimony, an abstract is not required by the rules:

No abstract was provided in this case because no hearings were held and no testimony was taken. Protective Life claims that Elizabeth was not excused from abstracting the affidavits and responses to requests for admissions, as these documents are analogous to testimony. However, Protective Life cites us to a case decided pursuant to an old version of our rule on abstracting. Our current rule provides that “[p]leadings and documentary evidence shall not be abstracted.” Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2(a)(5) (2007). The discovery documents at issue here were submitted as exhibits attached to pleadings. Such evidence is appropriately included in the addendum, pursuant to Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2(a)(8) (2007).


Call the Clerk Every Day: Counsel Who Was Unaware of Entry of Final Order Not Prejudiced by Clerk's Failure

In Francis v. Protective Life Insurance Company, the appellant made an argument that makes some common sense (especially to non-lawyers). Again, the timeline:

November 3, 2005: An amended and substituted order fax-filed by the Court. 

Moreover, the clerk failed to send this order to the appellant.

November 10, 2005: Hard copies of an order marked "Replaces fax filed 11-3-05", and correcting a minor error in the November 3 order, filed by the Court.

December 9, 2005: Appellant files notice of appeal.

The rule (for our non-lawyer readers) is that you have to file a "notice of appeal" in the trial court within thirty (30) days of the final order entered in the case. The final order is essentially one that leaves no undecided issues behind for the trial court to consider, and conversely, makes all of the issues ready for the appellate court's consideration. If you miss the thirty-day deadline, the appellate court won't hear your case--because it lacks "appellate jurisdiction." In this case, December 9 was timely if November 3 was the final order date, but too late if November 10 is the final order date.

Appellant's counsel claimed prejudice because the Clerk failed to copy counsel on the November 3 order. His argument was common-sense, especially for non-lawyers: how could I appeal from an order that I didn't know existed?

However, attorneys are held to a stringent standard (and so are non-lawyers, if they represent themselves):

According to her counsel, Elizabeth’s notice of appeal was filed late through no fault of his own, but because the circuit court failed to keep him informed about the filings in the case. We disagree. We have held that a lawyer and litigant must exercise reasonable diligence in keeping up with the happenings of a case. By the exercise of reasonable diligence so as to keep up with the filings in the case, Elizabeth and her counsel would have known about the order and judgment entered on November 3 and the notation on the November 10 order and judgment. Thus, we must reject Elizabeth’s claim that the notice of appeal was filed late through no fault of her own.

Thus the second lesson of this case is to call the clerk's office every day when you are waiting for a final order to be filed.

Appeal From "Clearly Nunc Pro Tunc" Amended Order Correcting Statutory Interest Rate Untimely

This is the first of three posts on Francis v. Protective Life Insurance Company, No. 07-206. In this case the Arkansas Supreme Court, per Justice Imber, reversed the court of appeals and dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction, holding that the appellant's notice of appeal was filed too late.

The widow plaintiff sued Protective Life after it denied her claim under a credit life insurance policy sold in connection with a retail installment contract for an automobile. She also sued Chrysler, who bought the retail installment contract from the original dealership. Chrysler counter-claimed for the balance owed under the contract. Johnson County Circuit Judge John S. Patterson granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance company and also granted Chrysler summary judgment for its claim against the plaintiff. 

A series of orders granting Chrysler's summary judgment motion were entered in the case:

November 1, 2005: Circuit court enters order granting Chrysler's summary-judgment motion. The Order contains a serious error: it grants a motion to dismiss, not a motion for summary judgment--whoever prepared the order apparently cut-and-pasted from an earlier order entered in the case.

November 3, 2005: An amended and substituted order fax-filed by the Court. The order grants the proper relief but still contains a mistake: the interest rate of the judgment was set at ten percent (10%).

November 10, 2005: Hard copies of an order marked "Replaces fax filed 11-3-05" filed by the Court. This order modified the rate of interest on the judgment to six percent (6%) per annum.

December 9, 2005: Appellant files notice of appeal.

The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the November 10 order was "clearly nunc pro tunc," in that it merely corrected the interest rate on the previous order. Thus: the thirty-day period to file the notice of appeal ran from November 3, 2005, not November 10, 2005, and the appellant filed too late. Case dismissed.

Rebriefing Ordered Due to Deficient Abstract and an Incomplete Record

Selmon v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, No. 06-1340, is an appeal from Circuit Judge Jay Moody's decision to deny the appellant an jury trial in his appeal from an adverse ERISA decision.

The trial court held a hearing on the appellant's jury-trial request but the appellant neither abstracted the hearing nor included a transcript of the hearing in the appellate record. The appellant maintained that the case was decided "primarily on the briefs of the parties and the administrative record," and that "[no] hearings on any substantive issue was [sic] held on any substantive issue." ([sic] in original).

Not good enough: the Court ordered appellant to add transcript of the hearing to the record within 60 days, and submit a new brief with proper abstracting.

Imperial Toy Does Not Have to Reveal Customer Names in Trademark Infringement Case

The Northern District of Iowa refused to compel production of customer names in J. Lloyd Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Toy Corp., 2007 WL 2934903 (N.D. Iowa 10/5/07).

 

J. Lloyd filed a trademark infringement action against Imperial Toy. In discovery, J. Lloyd requested the names of Imperial Toy's manufacturers and customers. Imperial Toy objected, and J. Lloyd filed a motion to compel. The court denied the motion, noting that the names of the defendant's customers are rarely if ever revealed in litigation.

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Monsanto Patent Infringement Case Will not be Stayed When Trial is One Month Away

The Eastern District of Arkansas declined to stay proceedings pending a reexamination by the USPTO in Monsanto v. Kyle, 2007 WL 2904143 (E.D. Ark. 10/3/07).

 

Monsanto's patent is being reexamined, and Kyle requested a stay of the court proceedings. The court easily declined this request. The case has been ongoing since November 2004, discovery (which was extensive) has concluded, dispositive motions have been filed and decided, and trial is scheduled for mid-November 2007. A stay would not simplify the issues at trial and would cause prejudice to Monsanto.

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Most of Documents Sought by Bloomberg to be Unsealed Remain Sealed

The District Court of Minnesota refused to unseal documents containing trade secrets and private information in In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Products Liability Litigation, 2007 WL 2914517 (D. Minn. 10/3/07).

 

The lawsuit involves defibrillators produced by Guidant Corp., which recently merged with Boston Scientific.  The parties had agreed to keep certain documents under seal. Bloomberg moved to intervene and to unseal documents that had been attached to summary judgment motions. The parties agreed to unseal some of the documents but objected to unsealing documents that contained trade secrets of the defendants or private information of the plaintiff. 

 

The court refused to unseal any documents containing trade secrets or private information, which constituted the bulk of the requested documents. The remaining documents will be unsealed.

Preliminary Injunction Denied in Patent Infringement Case Even Though Three of Four Factors Favored the Injunction

The Southern District of Iowa denied a preliminary injunction for patent infringement in Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 2007 WL 2914513 (S.D. Iowa 10/3/07).

 

Titan Tire is the licensee of a patent held by Goodyear and brought suit against Case New Holland. The motion for preliminary injunction was denied, but what makes this case interesting is that Titan Tire satisfied all the elements of a preliminary injunction except likelihood of success. CNH established a substantial question of validity by showing the patent is likely obvious when compared to the prior art. That alone was enough to defeat the preliminary injunction.

Court of Appeals Holds That "Fair Value" of an Interest in a Closely-Held Family Limited Partnerships is Not the Discounted "Fair Market" Value

The Court of Appeals, per Judge Glover, has held that when determining the "fair value" value of a withdrawing partner's interest in a closely-held family limited partnership, a trial court should not apply a discount reflecting the difficulty of selling such interests on the open market.

The case, involving timber land in Union County held in the Winn Family since 1848, is Winn v. Winn Enterprises, Limited Partnership, No. CA-06-1375.

The partnership was formed in 1984 for the express purpose of keeping the land in the Winn family. . . . [and] provides that a partner may withdraw upon six months’ notice to the partnership and the other partners. Upon withdrawal, the withdrawing partner “shall be entitled” to receive the “fair value” of that partner’s interest in the partnership as of the date of withdrawal. The partnership agreement was amended in October 2002 to provide that the partnership shall have a “right of first refusal” if a partner desires to sell his or her interest to someone outside the family.

Some of the partners withdrew from the partnership and litigation ensued over the value of the "fair value" of their interests. The trial court agreed with the withdrawing partner's expert as to the dollar value of their interest, but agreed with the defending partner's expert that a discount should be applied to that amount reflecting the interest's lack of control of the partnership and the difficultly in selling such interests on the open market.

The Court of Appeals held that discounts should not be applied when valuing these types of interests. The Court analogized to cases involving the valuation of the interest of a dissenting corporate shareholders:

In both instances, the individual (whether a dissenting shareholder or a withdrawing partner) is exercising a statutory right to withdraw from the entity and the entity is absorbing that interest. If discounts are applied, the entity obtains the withdrawing shareholder or partner’s interest for less than that interest would be worth in the hands of the withdrawing shareholder or partner. Further, because the two situations are analogous and the General Assembly used the term “fair value” in both statutes to specify the type of value the withdrawing partner or shareholder is to receive for his or her interest, we hold that the “fair value” provided for in section 4-43-604 does not include discounts for lack of control or lack of marketability.

The Court cited a Maryland case and also a string of law review articles and an American Law Institute study on the subject: "The American Law Institute and various commentators are also in agreement that discounts should not be applied in determining the “fair value” of a dissenting shareholder’s or withdrawing partner’s interest." (citing Am. Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations § 7.22(a) (Standards for Determining Fair Value) & cmt. e (1994); Harry J. Haynsworth IV, Valuation of Business Interests, 33 Mercer L. Rev. 457, 459 (1982); Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn V. Boraas, Betrayed, Belittled . . . But Triumphant: Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1173, 1186 (1996); and Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 Duke L.J. 613, 636-37 (1998).

Pro Se Appellant Must Also Follow the Appellate Procedure Rules and Put the Dismissal Order in the Addendum

The case is Gamble v. Ray and the Court of  Appeals, per Judge Hart, gave pro se litigant Robert G. Gamble III fifteen days to re-file his brief. "While we are mindful that Mr. Gamble is attempting to represent himself in this matter, it is well-settled law that a pro se defendant must abide by the same rules and standards as a licensed attorney."

Winning Argument on Appeal Waived When Raised For the First Time in the Reply Brief

In our third and final post on Rymor Builders, Inc. v. Tanglewood Plumbing Company, Inc.
 we explain why the trial court's reversible error did not lead to reversal: Rymor "waived this error because it failed to argue the point until its reply brief." Judge Marshall explains:

Rymor’s opening brief does not seek reversal based on the circuit court’s premature assessment of the witnesses’ credibility. Rymor states one point on appeal: “The ruling of the court is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.” Rymor’s seventeen-page argument covers the testimony and documents in detail, contending that the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Tanglewood broke the parties’ contracts. In a couple of places, Rymor notes that the circuit court rejected its claim because the court did not find Rymor’s witnesses credible. At no point in its opening brief, however, does Rymor argue that the circuit court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility at the close of Rymor’s case was a reversible error.

Quoting Judge Easterbrook, Judge Marshall explained the Court's holding:

An argument made for the first time on reply comes too late. Coleman v. Regions Bank, 364 Ark. 59, 64, 216 S.W.3d 569, 573 (2005). “A litigant wanting to challenge the core of the [circuit] court’s holding must do so in its opening brief and not hold its fire until after the appellee has filed its only brief.” Horn v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1993) [Easterbrook, J.].

Thus, an appellant with a winning issue on appeal lost the case.

Class Certification Denied in Arkansas Class Action Involving Georgia-Pacific

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed class certification in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, No. 07-105 (10/11/07).

 

Property owners filed a class action against Georgia-Pacific claiming nuisance. The plaintiffs alleged that toxic substances from the Georgia-Pacific plant in Crossett, Arkansas (seen below) caused injury to their property. The trial court certified the class.

 

The supreme court reversed, finding that common issues predominate over individual issues. The court observed that toxic tort cases, like products liability cases, are less often suitable for class action treatment. Because the essence of a nuisance claim is the interference with the property owner's use, the individual issues predominated, and this class action could not be certified.

 

Arkansas Easement by Prescription Cannot be Created Without Adverse Use

The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a finding of an easement by prescription in Baysinger v. Biggers, No. 07-99 (10/10/07).

 

Biggers had been using Baysinger's road since 1961. He filed a lawsuit and obtained a temporary restraining order that required Baysinger to widen a gate on the road so large trucks could fit more easily. The trial court went on to find that Biggers had established an easement by prescription on the road.

 

The court of appeals reversed, holding that Biggers failed to present any evidence regarding the nature of the use. To obtain an easement by prescription, the use must be open and adverse to the property owner. Length of time, no matter how long, is not enough to create an easement. Biggers relied solely on length of time; he failed to present any evidence at trial that the use was adverse to Baysinger.

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Error to Evaluate Witness Credibility at Motion to Dismiss (or Directed Verdict) Stage

For our second post on Rymor Builders, Inc. v. Tanglewood Plumbing Company, Inc., No. CA-06-1430, we highlight the first holding of the case: it is error for the trial court in a bench trial to assess witness credibility at the motion to dismiss case. The temptation for the trial judge to do so was natural considering the events at trial:

At the bench trial, Rymor called Tanglewood’s owner (Troy Wilkins) as its first witness. At the conclusion of Rymor’s examination of Wilkins,Tanglewood’s lawyer said, “I’ll just go ahead and put on my case-in-chief, your Honor, since you’ve heard that part of it[,]” and examined Wilkins further. Then Rymor’s two principals testified. All of the material documents about these transactions seem to have been admitted into evidence during the testimony of these three witnesses. . . .After Rymor rested, Tanglewood moved for a directed verdict.

Judge Fox then ruled on the directed verdict motion (politely but nevertheless painfully for any trial lawyer to hear):

After returning to the bench, the circuit court granted Tanglewood’s motion. The court said:

All right. With respect to [Tanglewood’s] motion, I’m going to grant it. There’s really not an easy way to say this. I simply didn’t find the testimony of the plaintiffs credible in this case.

(emphasis added). The circuit court eventually entered its judgment, which Tanglewood had written. The judgment recited that “the Court after hearing the evidence adduced by [Rymor] granted [Tanglewood’s] Motion for a directed verdict.”

The Court of Appeals held that it was error for the trial court to base the motion to dismiss ruling on the credibility of the witnesses, as the last post explains. But, there was no reversal or remand in this case -- as the next post explains.

Court of Appeals Dispels Common "Motion for Directed Verdict" Misnomer During a Bench Trial

As seems to be the case with many of Court of Appeals Judge D.P. Marshall's decisions, Rymor Builders, Inc. v. Tanglewood Plumbing Company, Inc., No. CA-06-1430, contains too much wisdom to contain in a single post--so we have three.

The fact patterns is that a builder sued a contractor for breach of three contracts, over the trim-out plumbing work for three separate residential building projects, described as "a classic swearing match" by Judge Marshall. Pulaski County Circuit Judge Tim Fox presided over a bench trial of the matter.

In this post, we highlight Judge Marshall's correction of the "common misnomer" of referring to a directed verdict in a bench trial:

We begin with a note about terminology. The bench and bar often refer to a “directed verdict” during a non-jury case. This is a misnomer. Because no jury is in the box, no verdict will be given. The proper motion to challenge the sufficiency of an opponent’s evidence in a non-jury case is a motion to dismiss. Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(a).

Judge Marshall notes the understandable source of the misnomer:

But there is truth in this common misnomer because the circuit court must use the same legal standard in evaluating a motion to dismiss as it would in evaluating a motion for a directed verdict. The court must decide “whether, if it were a jury trial, the evidence would be sufficient to present to the jury.” If the non-moving party has made a prima facie case on its claim or counter-claim, then the issue must be resolved by the finder of fact.  In evaluating whether the evidence is substantial enough to make a question for the fact-finder, however, the circuit court may not assess the witnesses’ credibility.

In this case, the trial judge improperly assessed witness credibility at the motion to dismiss stage; this was reversible error, but did not lead to reversal -- as the next two posts explain.

Equifax and Experian Must Produce Trade Secrets, Subject to Protective Order

Trade secrets must be produced, subject to protective order, in Fair Isaac Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 2007 WL 2791168 (D. Minn. 9/25/07).

 

Fair Isaac brought suit for false advertising, trade secret misappropriation and related unfair competition claims against Equifax, Experian, and other defendants. The thrust of the complaint is that defendants copied Fair Isaac's algorithms and software used to generate credit scores. In discovery, Fair Isaac sought the algorithm and software used by defendants to generate credit scores. The defendants objected to this discovery claiming the algorithms and software are trade secrets.

 

The court agreed the algorithms and software are trade secrets but that defendants must produce them to Fair Isaac. A protective order prevents Fair Isaac or its experts from using the information for any purposes other than the litigation. Any violation of the protective order is punishable by appropriate sanctions.

University Owns Copyright to Software Created by University Professors

The Southern District of Iowa granted summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim in Rouse v. Walter & Associates, LLC, 2007 WL 2745615 (S.D. Iowa 9/20/07).

 

This case involves a dispute over who owns a particular computer software. Plaintiffs were two professors at Iowa State University. Previously they had developed a software for measuring the quality of beef in live cattle before they were taken to slaughter. They asked a third professor at ISU to develop a new software. ISU then license the software to Walter & Associates. Plaintiffs brought suit claiming they owned the copyright to the software.

 

In a thorough opinion, the court found that ISU owns the copyright in the software, not the plaintiffs. The software was created in the course of the third professor's employment, and ISU was considered the author of the software. There was no written agreement transferring ownership to the plaintiffs, and the court granted summary judgment to defendants.

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Wildlife Research Center Wins Partial Summary Judgment in Patent Case

The District Court of Minnesota granted partial summary judgment in Wildlife Research Center, Inc. v. HME Products, LCC, 2007 WL 2746840 (D.Minn. 9/18/07).

 

Wildlife Research Center holds a patent for a hanging device that attracts game. The device uses a scented wick that is protected from moisture. HME sold a similar device but left its wick completely exposed to moisture. HME argued that WRC's patent only covered devices that completely protected the wick from moisture. Both parties moved for summary judgment.

 

The court found that WRC's patent covers devices that substantially protect the wick and that HME's device infringed the patent. The case will proceed to determine damages and any defenses HME may have.

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Best Value Inn Files Arkansas Trademark Infringement Action Against Helena Hotel

An Arkansas trademark infringement action was filed in the Eastern District of Arkansas. Thirty Eight Street, Inc. v. Bajrang, LLC, No. 07-920 (E.D. Ark., filed 10/2/07). Plaintiffs operate a chain of hotels under the trademarks Best Value Inn and America's Best Value Inn. According to the Complaint, Bajrang was a licensee operating a hotel in Helena, Arkansas. Plaintiffs terminated the license on February 14, 2007, but Bajrang continues to operate a hotel using Plaintiffs' trademarks. Plaintiffs did not file a motion for preliminary injunction.

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Arkansas Supreme Court Affirms Judge McGowan's Ruling on Pulaski County Emails

In a case interpreting Arkansas's Freedom of Information Act, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed Pulaski County Circuit Judge Mary McGowan's in camera FOIA review of emails sent between former Pulaski County Comptroller Ron Quillin and intervenor Jane Doe in Pulaski County v. Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Inc. Jane Doe was an employee of Government e-Management Solutions (GEMS), a company that had a services contract with the County.  Doe and Quillin became "romantically involved" during the period of Quillin's embezzlement and the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette requested, under the State's FOIA law, copies of emails between Quillin and Doe. The Court held in July that a case-by-case in camera determination was necessary to determine whether each individual email was subject to FOIA. (The Court declined to rule that all of the emails were subject to FOIA because they were created on a County computer.)

The second case presented two issues: standing of Jane Doe to challenge the circuit judge's FOIA ruling, and her constitutional challenge that disclosure of the emails violated her right to privacy.

As to standing: according to the Court, the Democrat-Gazette advanced an interesting argument that Doe "has no standing under the Arkansas FOIA because she is a citizen of Missouri." Unfortunately, the opinion does not elaborate on the Democrat-Gazette's argument, and the Court's analysis is conclusory:

Only a claimant who has a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy has standing. Here, Doe is not attempting to gain access to public records; she is merely trying to block the disclosure of e-mails that she sent and received. Therefore, she has a personal stake in the outcome of this case. Thus, even though she is not a citizen of Arkansas, we hold that she has standing to assert a privacy interest.

(citations omitted).

The Court went on to hold that Doe waived her right  to raise a privacy challenge to release of the emails because "the romantic relationship between Quillin and Doe was indistinguishably intertwined with the business relationship between the County and GEMS."

The Court also held that Doe waived her right to raise the issue:

[W]e note that the circuit court found that one particular email exchange between Quillin and Doe sent on March 12, 2006, beginning at 9:44 a.m., is evidence that Doe lost any expectation of privacy. The sexually explicit exchange concludes by Doe’s response: “Hey now. This is work email. goofball!” Quillin then responds at 9:58 a.m.: “Delete, delete, delete . . . .” This e-mail exchange proves that Doe knew the risk that the e-mails could become public, yet she continued to e-mail Quillin on the county’s computer, and therefore, lost any expectation of privacy.

A Criminal Plea Bargain is not a Basis for Collateral Estoppel, and Insurer Must Provide Defense Even if the Policy Does Not Cover Punitive Damages

The Arkansas Supreme Court denied summary judgment in an important insurance case. Bradley Ventures, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Arkansas, No. 06-1494 (10/4/07).

 

This case arose from a 2004 fire at AQ Chicken House in Bentonville. Joseph Trybulec was arrested for arson, and he pled guilty to the lesser charge of reckless burning. Trybulec lived with his parents, who had an insurance policy with Farm Bureau Insurance of Arkansas. The policy excluded any liability for injuries caused by intentional or criminal acts. It also excluded coverage for any award of punitive damages. The owners of AQ Chicken House filed suit against Trybulec, whose parents submitted a claim to Farm Bureau.

 

Farm Bureau moved for summary judgment on 2 grounds. First, Trybulec's guilty plea to reckless burning was collateral estoppel that he acted intentionally. Second, because the complaint sought punitive damages, Farm Bureau had no duty to defend the lawsuit. The trial court granted summary judgment.

 

The supreme court reversed on both grounds. The court observed that a criminal defendant is often highly motivated to plead guilty to a lesser crime rather than risk a trial for a more serious crime. It is unfair to use the plea bargain as collateral estoppel in a later civil case. As to punitive damages, the court noted that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. Farm Bureau must provide a defense even if Farm Bureau does not have to satisfy the punitive damages portion of an adverse judgment.

Court Can Interpret Judgment on Property Sale Five Years Later

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed an amendment of judgment in Kennedy Funding, Inc. v. Shelton, No. 06-1035.

 

The case involved a dispute over the Rest in Peace Cemetery in Pulaski County and several other properties. Both parties held mortgages on the cemetery. In 2001, the trial court entered an order finding that Kennedy Funding had the superior interest in the other properties but that Shelton's interest in the cemetery was superior to Kennedy Funding's interest. However, this language  discussing Shelton's interest only appeared in the body of the opinion and did not appear at the conclusion directing sale of all properties.

 

A judicial sale for the cemetery was scheduled in 2006. Prior to the sale, Shelton asked the trial court to clarify its order. The trial court did so and clarified that the sale would be conducted with Shelton having a superior interest over Kennedy Funding. 

 

Kennedy Funding argued that Ark. R. Civ. P. 60 applied and that the trial court had no right to amend the order after 90 days had passed.  The court of appeals disagreed, holding that a trial court may interpret a foreclosure order before the sale is conducted. However, the court indicated that the trial court could not interpret its order after the sale was conducted. See First Nat'l Bank of Lewisville v. Mayberry, 368 Ark. 243 (2006).

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Arkansas Easement Cannot be Extinguished Through a Tax Sale of the Underlying Property

The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment in Millwood Sanitation & Park Co., Inc. v. Mattingly, No. 07-134 (10/3/07).

 

The dispute centered around a parcel of land that was part of a subdivision in Hot Springs created in 1960. The parcel was designated "Park," and every subdivision owner had an easement over the property to access Lake Hamilton. Through the years, the various owners of the parcel failed to pay property taxes. Mattingly purchased the property and paid the back taxes. He filed suit to quiet title in the parcel. The trial court extinguished the easement, finding that the easement was abandoned from failure to pay taxes on the property.

 

The court reversed, holding that the easement is a separate interest from the underlying property. When taxes are assessed, the easement is not levied against and cannot be extinguished at a tax sale.

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