Candy Bouquet Files Arkansas Trademark Infringement Lawsuit

Candy Bouquet has filed a trademark infringement action against one of its former franchisees. Candy Bouquet International, Inc. v. McClendon, No. 08-340 (E.D. Ark., filed 4/ 17/08). According to the complaint, McClendon owned three Candy Boutique franchises. After violating the terms of her franchise agreements, Candy Bouquet terminated the agreements. The complaint alleges McClendon is still using Candy Bouquet's trademarks and trade secrets, although the complaint has no count for trade secret misappropriation.

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LaserAim Files Arkansas Patent Infringement Lawsuit

LaserAim has filed a declaratory judgment action in LaserAim Tools, Inc. v. SDA Manufacturing, LLC, No. 08-329 (E.D. Ark., filed 4/9/08). The complaint alleges that LaserAim had developed products that SDA should have disclosed in its application. The lawsuit seeks a declaration that SDA's patent is invalid.

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Vestcom Files Declaration of no Patent Infringement in Arkansas

Vestcom has filed a declaratory judgment of no patent infringement in Vestcom International, Inc. v. Information Planning and Management Service, Inc., No. 08-276 (E.D. Ark., filed 4/2/08). Vestcom provides shelf strips to Sears. According to the complaint, IPMS told Sears it holds a patent on the strips. Vestcom alleges that IPMS's patent is invalid and that its strips do not infringe the patent.

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A Practitioner's Note on Arkansas's No-Citation Rule, Highlighted by Today's Decision in Dodson

Today's per curiam in Dodson v. Norris highlights a textual subtlety of Rule 5-2: the plain text of the rule does not bar citation of unpublished decisions from other jurisdictions.

Rule 5-2 of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of Arkansas states, in pertinent part (emphasis supplied):

Opinions of the court of appeals not designated for publication shall not be published in the Arkansas Reports and shall not be cited, quoted or referred to by any court or in any argument, brief, or other materials presented to any court (except in continuing or related litigation upon an issue such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case).

(A note on the words "court of appeals" after the jump.)

The rule creates an interesting situation: advocates are free to tell the Arkansas Supreme Court what, for example, the Idaho Court of Appeals held via unpublished opinion on a certain issue, and even urge adoption of that court's reasoning. But advocates are not allowed to tell the Arkansas Supreme Court  what its own Court of Appeals held on the same issue.

Of course, the opinions of the Idaho Court of Appeals and the Arkansas Court of Appeals are equally binding on the Arkansas Supreme Court, that is, not at all.

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Arkansas Supreme Court, Having Recently Declined to Abolish its No-Citation Rule, Bars Litigant From Citing Unpublished Opinions

The Arkansas Supreme Court recently decided not to abolish its no-citation rule. The rule is contained in Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 5-2 and bars litigants from citing any unpublished decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals in a brief filed in the Arkansas appellate courts.

Today, in Dodson v. Norris, No. 07-1179, the Arkansas Supreme Court sent the message that it was quite serious about its decision to keep the no-citation rule. The petitioner, who is briefing a criminal law question certified to the Court by the Eastern District of Arkansas, requested permission to cite some unpublished Court of Appeals opinions because "only four published opinions exist on the issues involved in this appeal."

The Court replied, "no," by way of citation to Weatherford v. State, 352 Ark. 324, 101 S.W.3d 227 (2003). Weatherford was an interesting case that presented a federal due-process challenge to Rule 5-2, as well as arguments under the Arkansas Constitution--all of which were denied. In denying petitioner's motion, the Court wrote:

We dealt extensively with the use of unpublished opinions in Weatherford v. State . . . we said, “While Appellant may prefer those cases that are not published, there is nothing to indicate that Appellant is impaired in seeking immediate appellate relief by not being able to rely on those cases.” Such is the case here.

Objector's Failed Intervention Prevents Arkansas Supreme Court Review of State-Court Coupon Settlement

After receiving notice of a pending coupon settlement in a class action against Little-Rock based cellular service provider Alltel, Frank DeJulius attempted to intervene in the action and object to the settlement. He did not, however, opt out of the settlement. The trial court denied his motion to intervene and his objection to the settlement, and today the Arkansas Supreme Court, via Justice Imber, affirmed.

Justice Imber first cited the general rule that "if a person seeking intervention will be left with the right to pursue his own independent remedy against the parties, regardless of the outcome of the pending case, then he has no interest that needs protecting by intervention of right." Justice Imber then noted that DeJulius could have opted out of the settlement and sued Alltell on his own. "By requesting exclusion [from the class], DeJulius would have maintained the right to pursue his own independent remedy." Because he failed to do so, he failed to satisfy Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements.

DeJulius also stated that he received the class notice too late to be able to meaningfully review his options--arguing, in effect, that the late notice took away his right to opt out of the class. Justice Imber made short work of this argument, holding that DeJulius failed to make an adequate record.

Chief Justice Hannah Dissents From United States Supreme Court's Medtronic Decision in His Despain Concurrence

Chief Justice Jim Hannah's concurrence in Despain v. Bradburn is also a ringing dissent from the United States Supreme Court's holding in Riegel v. Medtronic. Chief Justice Hannah's concurrence is consistent with but, perhaps, more vigorous than Justice Ginsburg's Medtronic dissent, which expressed concern that the majority's decision "cut[s] deeply into a domain historically occupied by state law."

The Chief Justice writes:

I am . . . compelled to express my dismay at the summary abandonment of venerable principles of state common law that have been developed over many generations. By a conclusory and incomplete analysis, our law is dismissed. In the place of well-reasoned judicial decisions reaching back to the England of Blackstone, injured plaintiffs are told that instead of looking to their common law for redress they must look to a regulatory agency that has no power to grant them any redress.

Further, the MDA, which was enacted to protect the public against defective and unsafe medical devices through federal regulation, is now turned on its head and instead grants immunity to the providers of medical devices. I believe that the United States Congress will step in to amend the MDA and heal the injury caused in this case; however, the injury done to the common law and principles of federalism will not be so easily healed.

Justice Robert L. Brown joined the Chief's concurrence.

Arkansas Supreme Court Reverses Despain In Wake of Reigel v. Medtronic

The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed itself in light of a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Despain v. Bradburn, No. 07-714. The Court held in an earlier decision that "that the Medical Device Amendment (MDA) to the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not preempt a state-law tort claim filed against the manufacturer of a medical device."

Today, recognizing that the United States Supreme Court held "precisely the opposite" in its recent decision, Riegel v. Medtronic, the Court reversed itself on a petition for rehearing filed by Soundtec, one of the defendants in the case. Justice Glaze, who wrote the Court's original Despain opinion wrote today's decision.