U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas Holds Stranded Airline Passenger Has Tort Claims Under State Law
In Ray v. American Airlines, Inc., 2008 WL 2323923 (June 2, 2008), the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Judge Robert Dawson, held that an airline passenger who was allegedly confined against her will on the plane, under "deplorable conditions" while the plane waited on the tarmac for approximately 11 hours, has claims under state law for the torts of false imprisonment, outrage, and negligence.
In so holding, the court first rejected defendant's argument that Ray's state law claims were preempted by the federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 and the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. In rejecting the argument that the claims were preempted under the former act, the court looked to prior Supreme Court precedent interpreting the preemption provision of the Act stating that states are prohibited from enacting or enforcing a law which "ha[s] the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier." The court, looking to the case law of other circuits, most notably the Ninth Circuit in Charas v. Trans World Airlines, 160 F.3d 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) ultimately concluded that the word "service" was not intended by Congress to preempt all state claims for tortious acts of air carriers.
The court also rejected American's claim that the state law claims were preempted under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. In so holding, the court concluded that there were currently no federal regulations in place which governed the conduct of air carriers toward passengers when planes are stranded on the ground. While acknowledging the defendant's allegation that the Department of Transportation is currently considering whether such regulation in this area is needed, the court held that the claims were not preempted because no regulations currently exist.
Turning to the substance of Ray's state law claims, the court first held that Ray sufficiently stated a claim for false imprisonment under either Arkansas or Texas law. In short, the court concluded that she sufficiently alleged false imprisonment because she alleged that American refused to let her off the plane and that American misrepresented the reasons for confining the passengers on the plane. The court also held that Ray sufficiently stated a claim for outrage under either Arkansas or Texas law, stating that "under these circumstances, a jury could find that the Defendant's actions are so extreme and outrageous as to be 'beyond all possible bounds of decency, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Finally, the court upheld Ray's negligence claim, rejecting American's argument that under state law, no cause of action for negligence lies for breach of contractual duties.
